In this paper we characterize the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of a l ocationthen-price game where rms rst choose locations and after that compete for prices in two subsequent periods. Locations are thus seen as long term commitments. There are two t ypes of consumers, each with dierent v aluations for the variants oered by the rms. Due to changes in the fractions of the consumer types, competition in both periods diers. Firms a n ticipate that their l ocation choice inuences price competition i n b o t h p e r i ods and therefore maximize their lifetime prot. Although we c a nnot give explicit expressions for the rms' location choices, we can prove the existence of a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. JEL C l assication: C72, D43, L13, R11.
Introduction
In the literature the location decision of rms i s a ssumed to be a strategic one or, in other words, it i s a ssumed that rms take i n to account the eect of their location decision on the price they can set.
In case of more periods, if price competition is the same i n all periods, it is sucient to study the standard two stage location-then-price game d u e t o H o t e l l ing (1929) . This is the procedure followed in the literature. If however price competition diers over periods, for example due to changes from the demand side over time, the outcome of the standard model, with only one period of price competition, is not appropriate.
Usually rms are concerned about their (near) future and try to incorporate future changes into their decision (see for example H a rrison (1987) ).
In this paper we l ook at the situation where there are two periods of price competition. We adopt the view that rms take i n to account t h e i m pact of their decision on their per period prots. It should be stressed that, in this m odel, location is a two-period commitment. From an economic viewpoint this would be the case if the costs of relocation are relatively high.
In order to model the dierences in p r i ce competition between the two periods, w e consider an economy w i th two t ypes of consumers, having valuation dierences for the products oered by the rms. The fractions of consumer types m a y d i er over time. The model is motivated by the overlapping generations literature, that promotes the idea that consumers' valuations dier by a ge (see for example Samuelson (1958) , Diamond (1965 Diamond ( ) o r W eddepohl (1990 ).
Each c o nsumer buys one of the mutually exclusive v ariants. Consumers take a decision per period and buy from the cheapest source, i.e., the rm with the lowest overall price. As in Anderson, de Palma and Thisse (1992) we use an i ndirect utility function that i n v olves both transportation costs and quality dierence aspects.
The valuations consumers have f or the products of the rms can be seen as price adjustments to compensate for (subjective) quality d i erences.
We will derive that there exists a unique equilibrium for the location-thenprice game with two periods of price competition. Furthermore we g i v e a complete characterization of this equilibrium. The equilibrium outcome of course depends on the consumers' valuations and the fractions of c o nsumer types over time. We show i n which direction r m s' locations are forced by adding a second period of price competition.
The contribution of our model to location theory is t w ofold. First the long term (strategic) eects of l ocation choices are taken into account and second a framework is p r o vided to study an economy where dierent consumer types coexist.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 w e present the standard location-then-price game i n which consumers have v aluation dierences. We discuss this quite extensively because it is needed to understand Section 3. A s i n the literature, there is just one period of price competition. In Section 3 w e f ormulate a similar location-then-price game with valuation dierences, but now there are two periods of price competition. In Section 4 we c a lculate the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for this game. In Section 5 w e g i v e a n e x a m ple and in Section 6 w e draw some conclusions.
The basic m odel
There is a continuum of consumers distributed uniformly a long the line segment [0;1]. A fraction Y of them is young and a fraction O = 1 0 Y of them is old, henceforth referred to as the young (Y) and the old (O). Both types of consumers are thus located uniformly along the line segment. The young and the old dier with respect to their v a luations of the quality of a certain product oered by each of the rms. There are two rms. Let a i denote the valuation consumers of type 2 2 = f Y;Oghave for rm i's product. Each c o nsumer of type has real income w and buys one u n i t of a single v ariant.
Firm i locates at x i and sells variant i at (real) price p i . Firms are assumed to maximize pro t s i n a t w o s t a ge location-then-price game. We assume that rm 2 locates to the right o f r m 1 .
A s s u m p t i o n 1 Firm 2 l o c ates to t he right of rm 1 , i . e., x 1 < x 2 .
Note that rms' locations may w ell b e o utside the interval [0; 1]. The degree of d i erentiation can be higher then as compared to the maximum dierentiation result of d 'Aspremont, Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) . Sometimes this is called excessive d i erentiation (see Tirole (1988, p.286 ) and Anderson, de Palma and Thisse (1992, p.299) ). Excessive d i erentiation can be mitigated when demand is distributed more closely to the centre (see Webers (1994) for example).
Each t ype consumer buys one unit of the variant that oers the greatest conditional indirect utility g i v en by the additive f orm V i (x) = w 0 p i + a i 0 t ( x ; x i ) ;for i 2 f 1 ; 2 g ; (2:1) where x is the consumer's location in the characteristics space and t(x; x i )i s the transportation cost for shipping commodity i to the consumer's location. We assume t h i s transportation cost to be quadratic, i.e., the square of the distance between the consumer's l ocation and the rm's location. Note that t(x; x i ) i s i ndividual specic and that w and a i are group specic.
There are two d i erent m arket spaces. The market space of v ariant i among consumers of t ype 2 2 i s dened as
(2:2) that is the set of type consumers that prefer variant i over variant j.
The demand X i for commodity i is the sum of the demands for variant i by both types of consumers, i.e., By denition the sum of commodity d e m a nds, X 1 + X 2 , equals 1. We furthermore assume that the rms c a nnot inuence the valuation consumers have f or any o f t h e c o m m odities. The location of the type consumer indierent b e t w een buying from rm 1 and buying from r m 2 i s denoted bỹ x a n d i s g i v en byx
(2:4) being the midpoint between the rms' locations corrected for price dierences and consumers' valuation dierences. We f urthermore see that in generalx Y 6 = x O . Under the assumption that the consumers' valuation dierences are not t o o l arge, both rms h o w ever will sell their products to both the young and the old. We analyze a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in which rms rst choose locations and then choose prices. Given locations x 1 and x 2 in the rst stage, the corresponding price subgame i s solved by prices p 3 1 (x 1 ; x 2 ) and p 3 2 (x 1 ; x 2 ) such that 5 i (x i ; x j ; p 3 i ( x 1 ; x 2 ) ; p 3 j ( x 1 ; x 2 )) 5 i (x i ; x j ; p i ; p 3 j ( x 1 ; x 2 )) for all p i 2 [0; 1) and i 2 f 1 ; 2 g .
Prots, evaluated at the second-stage equilibrium (p 3 1 (x 1 ; x 2 ) ; p 3 2 ( x 1 ; x 2 )), are denoted by5 i (x i ; x j ) = 5 i ( x i ; x j ; p 3 i ( x 1 ; x 2 ) ; p 3 j ( x 1 ; x 2 )).
The equilibrium of the location game i s given then by the pair (x 3 1 ; x 3 2 ), satisfying Assumption 1 and satisfyinĝ 5 i (x 3 i ; x 3 j )5 i ( x i ; x 3 j ) f or all x i 2 (01;1) and i 2 f 1 ; 2 g : A s u b g a m e p erfect Nash equilibrium for the location-then-price game i s d ened by ( x 3 1 ; x 3 2 ) and by ( p 3 1 ( x 1 ; x 2 ) ; p 3 2 ( x 1 ; x 2 )) for all l ocation pairs (x 1 ; x 2 ). The corresponding equilibrium outcome i s ( x 3 1 ; x 3 2 ) a n d ( p 3 1 ; p 3 2 ) w h e r e p 3 1 = p 3 1 ( x 3 1 ; x 3 2 ) a n d p 3 2 = p 3 2 ( x 3 1 ; x 3 2 ) .
Theorem 2.1 Dene A 0 = P 22 (a 1 0 a 2 ). The unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for the location-then-price game is the location pair (0 1 4 + A0 3 ; 5 1 18(x20x1) f(x 2 0 x 1 )(4 0 x 1 0 x 2 ) 0 A 0 g 2 .F rom these expressions it follows that x 1 and x 2 must satisfy the equations (x 2 0 x 1 )(2 + 3 x 1 0 x 2 ) = A 0 a n d ( x 2 0 x 1 ) ( 0 4 0 x 1 + 3 x 2 ) = A 0 .This gives the solution x 3 1 = 0 1 4 + A0 3 and x 3 2 = 5 4 + A0 3 . One can verify that the second order conditions are satised.
It is easy to see that the equilibrium outcome i s ( x 3 1 ; x 3 2 ) = ( 0 1 4 + A 0 3 ; 5 4 + A 0 3 ) a nd (p 3 1 ; p 3 2 ) = ( 3 2 + 2 A 0 3 ; 3 2 0 2 A 0 3 ). If A 0 = 0 the consumers 'on average' have the same preference for both products. In this case the equilibrium outcome is ( x 3 1 ; x 3 2 ) = ( 0 1 4 ; 5 4 ) a nd (p 3 1 ; p 3 2 ) = ( 3 2 ; 3 2 ). Prots are 3 4 per rm. I f A 0 > 0 consume r s o n a v erage have a stronger preference for the product of r m 1 , w hich enables rm 1 to set a higher price and to locate closer to the centre. Firm 2 has to set a lower price and moves from the centre in order to soften price competition. Consequently r m 1 ' s prot increases and rm 2's p r o t decreases. The situation A 0 < 0 is similar.
Note that equilibrium prices are non-negative f or A 0 2 [0 9 4 ; 9 4 ]. Equilibrium prots for rm i are given then by 5 i ( x 3 i ; x 3 j ; p 3 i ( x 3 1 ; x 3 2 ) ; p 3 j ( x 3 1 ; x 3 2 )) = 1 3 ( 3 2 0 (01) i 2A0 3 ) 2 and thus rms' prots dier for A 0 6 = 0 . This does not necessarily mean that in order to guarantee rms equal prots consumers' valuations should be equal over rms, but that a h i gher valuation b y one ty p e o f c o nsumers is compensated through a lower valuation by the other type of consumers.
Recall that consumer valuations for the products are given exogenously. W e thus abstract from the fact that rms h a v e a n incentive to inuence A 0 through the consumer valuations for their product.
3 Changing fractions of consumer types o v e r t i m e In the previous section we h a v e looked at the situation where rms choose locations and prices in a t w o-stage game. Firms thereby take the fraction o f consumer types and the consumer valuations into account. Now w e w ant t o e xtend the model to one where alsochanges over time i n the fractions of consumer types are taken into account. Once rms h a v e settled, they serve the market from this l ocation in the subsequent periods. We assume that there are two periods, t and t + 1 ,i n which r m s set prices. Before the start of period t rms choose locations. Firm i 2 f 1 ; 2 g l ocates at x i and s e l ls commodity i at price p i in period 2 T = f t; t + 1 g .
Again there is a c o n tinuum of consumers distributed uniformly along the line segment [ 0 ; 1]. In period 2 T a fraction Y of them is young and a fraction
The valuation consumers of t ype 2 2 h a v e f or rm i's product is assumed to be constant o v er time and is g iven by a i as before.
In period each t ype consumer buys one unit of the variant that oers the greatest conditional i ndirect utility g iven by (3:7) where the interpretation of the terms i s the same as before. Note that only prices are time dependent.
The market space of variant i among consumers of type 2 2 i n period 2 T is dened as
; j6 =i g ; (3:8) i.e., the set of type consumers at time that prefer variant i over variant j.
The demand X i for commodity i in period is the sum of the demands in period for variant i by both types of consumers, i.e., where X i is given by (3.11) and is the time discount factor. For simplicity we take = 1 . F i rm i's lifetime p r o t is the (discounted) sum of the per period prots. Firm i's prot in period is equal to 5 i (x i ; x j ; p i ; p j ) = p i X i : (3:13) The price choice in period t does not aect the price choice in period t + 1 . T herefore we can consider the price choices in both periods seperately. The price game in period is solved by prices p 3 1 (x 1 ; x 2 ) and p 3 2 (x 1 ; x 2 ) such that 5 i (x i ; x j ; p 3 i (x 1 ; x 2 );p 3 j (x 1 ;x 2 )) 5 i (x i ;x j ;p i ;p 3 j (x 1 ;x 2 )) for all p i 2 [0; 1) and i 2 f 1 ; 2 g . F or ease of notation let5 iL (x i ; x j ) = 5 i L ( x i ; x j ; p 3 i t ( x 1 ; x 2 ) ; p 3 j t ( x 1 ; x 2 ) ; p 3 1 t +1 (x 1 ; x 2 ) ; p 3 2 t +1 (x 1 ; x 2 )). The equilibrium of the location game i s t h e n g i v en by ( x 3 1 ; x 3 2 ) s a tisfyinĝ 5 iL (x 3 i ; x 3 j )5 iL (x i ; x 3 j ) f or all x i 2 (01;1) and i 2 f 1 ; 2 g : A subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for the location-then-price game i s d ened by ( x 3 1 ; x 3 2 ) and by f(p 3 1t (x 1 ; x 2 ) ; p 3 2 t ( x 1 ; x 2 ));(p 3 1t+1 (x 1 ; x 2 ) ; p 3 2 t +1 (x 1 ; x 2 ))g for all location pairs (x 1 ; x 2 ). The corresponding equilibrium path is (x 3 1 ; x 3 2 ) a nd f(p 3 1t (x 3 1 ; x 3 2 ) ; p 3 2 t ( x 3 1 ; x 3 2 )), (p 3 1t+1 (x 3 1 ; x 3 2 ) ; p 3 2 t +1 (x 3 1 ; x 3 2 ))g. Lemma 3.1 For 2 T dene A = P 22 (a 1 0 a 2 ). The price game at time is solved b y p r i c es p 3 1 (x 1 ; x 2 ) = 1 3 ((x 2 0 x 1 )(2 + x 1 + x 2 ) + A ) and p 3 2 (x 1 ; x 2 ) = 1 3 ((x 2 0 x 1 )(4 0 x 1 0 x 2 ) 0 A ) . P roof As noted before the price choice in period t does not aect the price choice in period t + 1. Therefore the solution of each price stage is found by Theorem 2.1.
As we s a w already in Section 2 the rm selling the product for which the consume r s o n a v erage h a v e a stronger preference, is able to set a higher price while the other rm can only c harge a lower price. To determine a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for the location-then-price game w e a l so have t o s o l v e the location stage. This i s d o ne in the next section.
4 Subgame p e rfect Nash equilibria In this section we s h o w that there exists a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for the model with changing fractions of consumer types. Furthermore we give a complete equilibrium characterization. This shows in which direction and to what extent rms adjust their l ocations in case price competition diers over the two periods. Given the equilibrium price schemes (p 3 1t (x 1 ; x 2 );p 3 2t (x 1 ; x 2 )) and (p 3 1t+1 (x 1 ; x 2 ); p 3 2t+1 (x 1 ;x 2 )) i t i s e a s y t o c heck t h a t X i = We assume that the degree of verticaldierentiation is limited, i.e., the value of A for 2 T i s not too big. The reason for this assumption willbecome c l ear later.
Assumption 2 For all 2 T , A 2 3 .
Without loss of generality w e restrict ourselves to the situation A 0. This means that for the two-period situation consumers 'on average' prefer rm 1's product to rm 2's product. The meaning of 'on average' is s l ightly d i erent then before. It is still possible that rm 2's product is preferred in one period, but this is o setby a stronger preference for rm 1's product in the otherperiod. Note that the existence of a L; M; and satisfying conditions (i) to (iv) is g uaranteed for any A and 1 because the equation F A (C) = 0 has ve real roots.
It is not possible however to give explicit analytical expressions for M; L; and in the general case, and therefore we h a v e t o c o m pute these numbers numerically.
For the special situations A t = A t+1 and A t = 0A t+1 we g ive analytical expressions in the following two corollaries. We o m it the proof of these corollaries because they can be seen as a direct consequence of Lemma 4.2. Corollary 4.3 Suppose A t = A t+1 . Then L = 0 1 2 , M = 5 2 , 2 = 9 4 + A 2 , and 2 = 9 4 0 A 2 solve (i) to (iv). Furthermore C 1 < C 2 C 3 C 5 < C 4 . F or the special situation A t = A t+1 = 0 w e only h a v e three dierent roots. This result also holds for the more general case A t = 0A t+1 . But then x1(C) > 3=4 a nd x2(C) < 1=4, which c ontradicts Assumption 1 . F o r t he situation C = 1 we thus essentially do not n eed Assumption 2.
Note that this is equivalent to the condition in Assumption 2. With the above results we c a n p r o v e t h e f o llowing proposition. . Then x 2 (C) 0 x 1 (C) = 1 2 0 2 y is minimal for y 2 and prices are maximal. Because X 1 = X 2 = 1 2 in a l l three situations, prots for both rms a re maximized for y = y 2 . One can check that the second order conditions for a maximum for both rms a re indeed satised for y = y 2 .
Next we consider the situation C k 6 = 1 . Equation (4.16) can be rewritten then as Proof It is clear that there only exists a location equilibrium if the second order conditions for both rms are satised. We w i ll prove that for C k < 1 + A 12 and C k > 1 + 4 A 12 the second order conditions are not satised for b o th rms. From (4.15) we see that the second order conditions for a maximum are 2(x 1 (C)0x 2 (C)) 3 (4 + 3x 1 (C) + x 2 ( C ) ) + 1 < 0 f or rm 1 and 2(x 1 (C) 0 x 2 (C)) 3 (8 0 x 1 (C) 0 3x 2 (C)) + 1 < 0 for rm 2. W i th the help of equation (4.22) subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for the location-then-price game is the location pair (0 1 4 + 8 3 ; 5 4 0 8 3 ) and price p airs f( 1 3 ((x 2 0 x 1 )(2 + x 1 + x 2 ) + A t ) ; 1 3 ((x 2 0 x 1 )(40 x 1 0 x 2 ) 0 A t )); ( 1 3 ((x 2 0 x 1 )(2 + x 1 + x 2 ) + A t +1 ); 1 3 ((x 2 0 x 1 )(4 0 x 1 0 x 2 ) 0 A t +1 ))g. Proof This i s a n i m m ediate consequence of Lemma 3 .1, Proposition 4.5 and Lemma 4 .6.
When A = 0 , t h i s m eans that consumers' preference for rm i in period t equals consumers' preference for rm j in periodt+1, rm i can charge a higher price in period t and rm j can c harge a higher price in period t + 1. In case A t 6 = 0, both rms will locate more close to the centre and price competition is enlarged. Prots for both rms a re (x 3 2 0 x 3 1 ) + 1 1 8(x 3 2 0x 3 1 ) . One can check easily that prots are maximal f o r A t = A t +1 = 0. Oscillating preferences of consumers thus decrease both rms' prots. The (unique) subgame perfect equilibrium for the location-then-price game is the location pair (0 1 4 + 8A 3 + 9 A ; 5 4 + 8 A 3 0 9 A ) and price p airs f( 1 3 ((x 2 0 x 1 )(2 + x 1 + x 2 ) + A t ) ; 1 3 ((x 2 0 x 1 )(40x 1 0x 2 )0 A t ));( 1 3 ((x 2 0 x 1 )(2 + x 1 + x 2 ) + A t +1 ); 1 3 ((x 2 0 x 1 )(4 0 x 1 0 x 2 ) 0 A t +1 ))g. Proof This follows from Proposition 4.10 and equation (4.23).
When A > 0 the consumers' preference for rm 1's product gives this rm some m onopoly p o w er, which enables it to gain higher prots. The other rm gains lower prots. Firm 1's p r o ts are equal to (x 3 2 0 x 3 1 )(1 + 28A 9 ) 2 + A 3 (1 + 28A 9 ) + 1 18(x 3 2 0x 3 1 ) and rm 2's prot are equal t o ( x 3 2 0 x 3 1 ) ( ( 1 0 2 8 A 9 ) 2 0 A 3 ( 1 0 2 8 A 9 ) + 1 18(x 3 2 0x 3 1 ) . It is easy to check that r m 1 ' s p r o ts are higher than rm 2's prots.
Now w e h a v e a nalyzed all the basic ingredients of the problem, w e are able to prove the following theorem. For A = 0 both rms a djust their location c hoices symmetrically, i . e., one rms adds some xed amount t o i ts competitive l ocation choice and the other rm substracts the same a m ount f rom i ts competitive l ocation choice. ForA > 0 the location choices are adjusted asymmetrically. F i rms d o a lso take i n to account their relative m onopoly power. Consequently rms' prots in e q uilibrium are the same for A = 0, whereas they dier for A 6 = 0 . 5 Comparative statics: an example In this section we l o o k a t a n e x a m ple where the fraction of young and old consumers oscillates. The fraction of y o ung consumers in period t equals the fraction of o l d consumers in period t + 1 , i . e., Y t = O t+1 . Automatically this means that the fraction of old consumers in period t equals the fraction of young consumers in period t + 1 . R ecall t h a t t and t + 1 a re the two periods of price competition. Furthermorewe assume that a Y 1 0a Y 2 = 1 2 and that a O 1 0a O 2 = 0 1 2 . This means that young consumers have a higher valuation for the product of rm 1 and that o l d c o nsumers have a h i gher valuation for the product of rm 2. If one thinks for example o f t w o rms t h a t sell bicycles, then rm 1 would be the one that sells m ountainbikes and rm 2 is the one that sells traditional bikes. By construction A t = 0A t+1 where A t = ( Y t 0 O t )(a Y 1 0a Y 2 ) = Y t 0 O t 2 . W e c a n apply Theorem 4.7 t o c a l culate the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcome.
In Figure 1 we have l isted the values of A t , A t+1 , , and 8 for dierent values o f Y t a n d O t a n d i n Figure 2 we h a v e given the corresponding values of x 1 , x 2 , p 1t , p 1t+1 , p 2t , and p 2t+1 . From these gures we see that rms' locations are closer the less equal the distribution of consumer types. In case consumer fractions are constant, the competitive outcome 2 results. In all other cases rms' prices dier. The rm having the more (less) attractive v ariant for the majority of the consumers, can set a higher (lower) price than in the competitive situation.
In Figure 3 we h a v e given the equilibrium values ofx Y t ,x Y t +1 ,x O t , x O t +1 , X 1t , X 1t+1 , X 2t and X 2t+1 . W e see that the demand a rm has in a certain period is higher the greater the fraction of consumers for which i ts product is more attractive than the other rm's product is. Because the fraction of young and old consumers oscillates, also rms' demand oscillates. The reason is that rm 1 has a product that is relatively more attractive t o y o ung consumers then the product of rm 2. The higher the fraction o f y oung consumers, the greater rm 1's prot, and the higher the fraction of old consumers, the greater rm 2's prot. Because the consumer fractions oscillate, one rm earns higher prots in the one period and the other rm earns higher prots in the other period. The situation becomes more interesting if we change a O 1 0a O 2 from 0 1 2 to 0 1 4 . Then A = 1 4 and we can apply Theorem 4.11 to calculate the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcome. This i s summarized in gures 5, 6 and 7. We s e e that rms' prots dier and furthermore rm 1's prots are maximal in case consumer fractions are constant, whereas rm 2's p r o ts are higher the greater the change in consumer fractions. The total surplus that rms a ttract from the consumers is h i gher than i n t h e c o m petitive c a se. 
Conclusions
In this paper w e examined the situation where two rms compete in prices for one or two periods. Firms take both this price competition and dierences in consumer valuations into account i n determining their optimal location. It is clear that there will be a trade-o between price and quantity. Whenever the eect of the dierences in valuations is the same i n b o th periods, i.e., A t = A t+1 , both rms m o v e i n the same direction. Whenever the eect of the dierences in v a luations is the opposite in both periods, i.e., A t = 0A t+1 , both rms m o v e in the opposite direction.
Although we h a v e n o t been able t o g i v e explicit analytical expressions for the rms' location c hoices, it was possible to prove the existence of a unique solution for the location-then-price game.
In case A t = 0A t+1 both rms earn the same prots and changing fractions of consumer types o v er time decrease both rms' prots. In case A t 6 = 0A t+1 , one rm earns strictly higher prots.
An interesting topic for future research is to extend the model by a l lowing for the possibility t h a t a rm does not necessarily a ttract both typesof consumersin bothperiods. This basically means that we should leave the (strong) assumption that consumers buy at a n y price.
Furthermore one can weaken the assumption that rms cannot inuence the valuations consumers have f o r their product.
